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In this article we try to  analyze the extend of product differentiation in the Tunisian’s context, 
by relying  on an investigation drived at a sufficiently disaggregated level of sectors. In the 
first section, we tend to expose the relationship between market structure, product 
differentiation and intra-industrial trade. Then, we reexamine in the second section some 
operational proxies of products variety that were previously analyzed by the empirical 
literature. In the third section, we tend to appreciate the strength of products differentiation in 
the specific case of Tunisia and in 8 different sectors.    
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Section 1: Market structure, product differentiation and intra-industrial trade: 
 
1-1 Market structure and innovation: 
 
     Throughout the economic literature, link between industrial market structure and 
investments in R&D or innovations has powerfully attracted attention. In fact, an important 
part of economic studies has extremely discussed the impact of competition’s intensity on the 
incentives of innovative efforts. In his predecessor initiative, Schumpeter (1942) was an 
original partisan of the monopole’s alternative. At this level, Schumpeter postulates that an 
important part of market, promoted by the predominance of monopolistic competition, 
represents a decisive factor to encourage firms to innovate. Those advantages reflected by a 
greater part of market, allow to share fixed costs of R&D among a greater number of products 
variety, enhance the funding to a favorite markets, achieve an important economies of scale 
and finally permit to firms that has a most important size and most diversified to explorer the 
new discoveries. In this context, competition in one market leads to competition in a different 
market with the emergence of a new cheaper product that incorporates a more important fixed 
costs and insignificant marginal costs. In others words, imperfect competition leads to 
important market parts under the presence of huge entry barriers explicated in turn by 
inability to pursue the speed of innovations. In this later case, market’s parts depend on 
intellectual proprieties. In according to Schumpeterian dynamics, the attempts of learning are 
originated from large firms that are more able to innovate and improve their productivity. This 
is plausibly explicated by the economies of scale, the availability of internal resources in the 
case of imperfect markets and /or uncertainty, and synergies between the technological, 
productive, marketing and distribution’s activities. More recently, Link (19881) has explored 
these arguments and has showed that the rate of return of R&D is positively associated with 
the market’s size.  In the same line of literature, Cohen and Klepper (1996) supported the 
argument according to that, as large firms produce a greater output, they are more able to 
apply the results of R&D to more range of products and process and so to share their costs. 
However, a contradictory theoretical developments has been elaborated by Griliches (1980) 
and Wang and Tsai (2003) indicating the absence of any effective association between the 
R&D and the size of firms, that allow in turn to reject the Schumpeterian hypothesis. Beside, 
Arrow (1962) established a reversed supposition by putting forward the advantages of 
competitive structure revealed by the inability to appropriate the incomes associated with the 
efforts of innovation, and therefore the feebleness of the monopolistic structure. It’s just 
through more recent empirical studies that link between the size of market and the innovation 
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has been examined for the differentiated products. In a set of recent economic analyzes, a 
forceful competition lays as a precondition in order to generate (ex-ante) favorable incentives 
to innovation. Therefore, a statutory relaxation through stimulating regulations of the 
competition in the products market, can facilitate the entry of firms, and in turn, reduce the 
administrative barriers, by eliminating the control of prices and the others operational 
controls. Consequently, when innovator firms get (ex-post) a certain power of market in the 
new products (process), the R&D can be motivated. The capacity to discount a sufficient 
income, in order to cover up the costs of innovations, as well as, the existence of a potential 
competitor pressures in order to guarantee the continuity of innovator activities of firms 
constitute the good environment indispensable to their surviving. However, the importance of 
this environment can occur the paradox between the competition and the effectiveness of 
appropriability’s mechanisms, especially when we are asked on the role played by spillovers 
of R&D to assure the diffusion of technological change. This is why, there are not a decisive 
experimental results insisting on the importance of the appropriation in stimulating the 
innovating efforts (Baldwin and coll 2000). Indeed, an increased effectiveness of the 
mechanisms of protection, can lead to the emergence of a temporary monopoly rent   
imposing in turn a right of ownership, wich  can overpower  not only competition to return on 
this crenel of market but also by dissuade any effort of R&D in this field. Then, These 
mechanisms can become a dissuasive means facing the effort of innovation (Morck and 
Yeung 2001). The repercussions of competition on the R&D often appear according to the 
sector in question.  In the sectors of weak technology, the intensity of competition stimulates 
the investment in the R&D, and thus, the innovating activity with an aim of preserving the 
shares of market by reducing the costs and by decreasing the prices. In the highly 
technological sectors, characterized by the division of " dominant " technologies wich are 
relatively homogeneous, competition is accompanied by a process of " cumulative " 
innovation intended to reduce the costs and to improve quality compared to that of the 
competitors.  In other sectors of high technology, competition in the markets, is related to 
several different technologies, each one being encouraged by various innovating firms.  Under 
this context, the efforts of R&D are mainly intended to horizontally differentiate the products 
and to acquire shares on  good markets, which finally has an incidence on the total 
productivity of the factors, that it is difficult to identify. Rosenberg (1996) considers a 
duopoly in a horizontally differentiated market in which the prévalente structure is that of the 
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competition of Cournot.  He shows that the firms will always invest in the innovations of 
products (1)
(1)  and processes (2)  and any rise in the size of market, can modify the investments 
in R&D in favour the innovations of products. Bonamo and Haworth (1998) are based on a 
model with a vertical differentiation of product. Only one of the two firms is likely to 
innovate and the firm in question must decide between the innovation of products or the 
innovation of processes.  They discover that the firm of big (weak) size chooses the 
innovation of products (processes) when competition is intense (competition of Bertrand).  
The reversed situation is carried out when the degree of competition is weak (competition of 
Cournot).  Flippini and Martin (2002) extend the analysis of Bonanno and Haworth (1998) in 
a model in which the duopolies simultaneously decide on the innovation to carry out.  Their 
analyses lead to two balances in which the firms of large and low size choose the same type of 
innovation and only one asymmetrical balance. Beyond, they show that only the asymmetrical 
case,  supports a situation in which the vertical intensity of competition is relaxed.  P.Weib 
(2003) analyzes the problem of the innovation like a decisional game with two stages. In the 
initial situation, there are two firms producing each one a variety of basic goods.  Like first 
stage, the firms choose simultaneously one of the three following alternatives: An innovation 
of products, an innovation of processes or no innovation.  During the second stage, the firms 
enter in competition in the market (3)
(3)   The strategic variable of the firm during the second 
stage of the decisional problem appears either through a variation in the price (competition of 
Bertrand) or a change in the quantities (competition of Cournot).  A firm continuing an 
innovation of products, offers in the second stage related to competition, a new variety in he 
market and gives up the old one, which will increase the degree of the differentiation of the 
products.  In other words, the profits of the firm increase if the degree of competition 
weakens.    The result of this analysis is that the small degree (high) of products differentiation 
(competition) slightly reinforces the introduction of new products.  The firms prefer relatively 
                                                 
(1)   The innovation of products is a change in the degree of  product differentiation.  According to the 
schumpetérien concept, it is introduced like an investment for the creation of new goods.   
 
(2)  the innovation of processes is a reduction in the unit costs of production.  It indicates according to the 
schumpétérien approach, an investment for the production of the already existing but less expensive goods.   
 
(3)    In this model, the nature of   products differentiation   is not specified.  Moreover, the nature of the market 
relating to the second stage is not identified, in the manner, the strategic variable of the firms can be the price 








1-2- technological specialization versus technological diversification:   
 
     The notion of technological diversification was largely associated with  intention 
expressed by firms to improve the quality of their products.  According to Breschi et al. 
(2003), in a market of imperfect competition, and with an aim of preventing the vulnerability 
of the potential competitors, a firm is all the more incited to improve quality of its production.  
This is why, the firms require " to disperse their innovating activities on several 
technologies".  Nelson (1959), considers that the firms which diversify their technological 
base are those which profit from new possibilities of technological innovation.  Indeed, in  the 
case in which several innovations are indicated to solve the problems that are not connected to 
the innovating activity of the firm, the most diversified firms will profit more from their 
activities of research, because they will collect more effectively the social benefits of their 
innovations.  The empirical analysis carried out by M.G.Vega (2004) on a panel of the active 
European firms in R&D, consolidates explicitly this idea.  This author shows that the intensity 
of the R&D and the number of the patents increase with the degree of technological 
diversification.  The firms adopting the strategies of technological diversification can join 
ascending opportunities as regards the technological spillovers on the one hand, and  
reduction of the risks associated with the technological investments in the another share.  In 
this last case, the keen competition (particularly in the markets with strong innovations), the 
technological change and the imitation are sources of economic depreciation or obsolescence 
of technology(4)   In this situation, the technologically diversified firms are held to invest 
indistinctly in R&D, because of the diversification of their wallets of research tends to reduce 
the inherent risks of the R&D projects. When the firm diversifies its efforts of R&D on 
several technological alternatives, it can reduce the dissension associated between the outputs 
and  its investments in R&D (5)  In other words, the actors that are downpour to the risk are 
been willing to invest a high proportion of their richness in the risky innovating projects 
(Nelson 1959, Tirole 1988, Scherer 1999).  Lastly, technological diversification can prevent 
                                                 
(4) Schumpeter (1942) characterizes this situation by the creative destruction.   
 
(5)  Scherer (1999), shows that on average, roughly, half of the technological projects undertaken by   firms is 
successeful.    
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the negative effect of closing in only one particular technology, which thus, allows the 
evolution and the restoration of the firm.  However, the debate technological specialization / 
diversification obviously upset the advantages before quoted and confined with the latter.  
While, according to Breschi et al. (2003), the firms which target their activities of R&D for a 
limited number of technological fields, can benefit more massively  from these activities.  In 
this context, technological specialization can start again the economies of scale associated 
with the procedures of  learning, facilitate the transfer of knowledge between essential 
technologies of the firm, and profit leading by  " the comparative technological advantage " of 
the firm.  In this circumstance, the specialization of the countries and the international 
technological trade are two facets of the same corner in which the international market of 
technological knowledge is applied and developed. More technologically specialized firms are 
more innovating than those more diversified.  The partisans of technological specialization 
often attach their arguments to the cumulative character of technological knowledge which 
constitutes a joined product of the capacity of absorption.  This specialization involves 
positive effects in terms of general efficiency of the procedure of innovation: The firms can 
concentrate on technological fields in which they hold  a technological advance and  therefore 
relying on  the complementary external technological knowledge. By wondering about 
specialized or diversified nature relative to industrial agglomerations, the literature of the new 
geographical economy has discussed this dilemma a long time.  Economic studies related to 
diversity and specialization does not lead to an explicit interpretation as for a dichotomic 
rupture between these two concepts. This problem is brought back even to the concept of 
diversity. Indeed, according to Martin and Ottaviano (1999), diversity is equivalent to an 
intra-sectoral environment produced by the structure of market characterized by  monopolistic 
competition.  However, according to Jacob (1969) this term means the intersectorial relations, 
in others words, links between dedicated sectors each one aimed to produce goods or services 
without the existence of an effective proximity as regards use.  In this last case, the structure 
of market of the type Dixit- Stiglitz (1977) is mobilized.  The idea defended by Jacob (1969) 
is based on the fact that the most crucial externalities  favorable to the life of the 
agglomerations are the result of the  crossed fertilizations between various competences.  In 
other words, Jacobs (1969) was based on either the double observation of the interactions 
between industries and services inside the great agglomerations on the one hand, and the 
theories of the technical change which propose the strong propagation of the externalities 
between industries.  Through this line, the growth would be more supported by technological 
diversity compared to technological specialization under the effect of the growing innovation 
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appropriatenesses that presents by the means of  exchange of   different ideas and the new 
combinations: " As  the number of the varieties and division of workers  are significant,   the 
capacity of the economy to add more types of goods and services is more large "  (Jacobs 
1969). The agglomeration of the economic activities was obviously associated with the 
phenomena of concentration, the activities of production and the activities of innovation.  The 
first would be more sensitive to the pecuniary externalities (that result from the commercial 
relations between the economic actors) while the seconds would rest rather on externalities of 
knowledge or direct communication between agents and relations face to face. Thus, the 
agglomeration results from the overlap of these various phenomena (Fujita and Thisse 1997). 
In this context, the debate specialization / diversification becomes more and more complex 
and moves towards a new debate centered on the dynamic implication and the orientation  
externalities of R&D to the centre or between the borders of industries.  Diversity, that  relates 
to the final goods (Krugman 1991) or to the intermediate goods available (Krugman and 
Venables 1995) was regarded as the product joint of the process of agglomeration.  In the line 
of research of Krugman (1991), they are more particularly the  commercial relations of offer 
and  demand, taking the form of the pecuniary externalities which are brought into the game 
to explain the industrial agglomeration. These externalities emerge through many 
configurations according to whether these commercial relations concern a dependent producer 
and consumer or several producers or not with vertical relations.  The liberty  of entry of new 
firms in an agglomeration, can reinforce the positive pecuniary externalities for the firms 
previously localised in this agglomeration, through opportunities which it presents as regards 
widening of the market via the additional demand that it gets. Moreover, this entry can lead to 
a fall of the production costs for the sectors located downstream, on the one hand, by an effect 
of competition and, on the other hand, by a minimization of the costs of transport.  In the 
same way for the above mentioned reasons, the wellbeing of the consumers improves.  This 
downstream entrainment effect is simultaneously combined by an upstream effect.  At this 
level, Krugman (1991) advances: « It is desirable to live and to produce under a 
concentration of the industrial productions due  to the weakest price of the produced goods ".  
This is equivalent to an economy caracterized  by the presence of a diversity of the 
produced(6) goods explained by the fact that the structure of market incorporated in the model 
of Krugman (1991) is that defined by Dixit and Stiglitz (1997), characterized by the 
                                                 




monopolistic competition, which puts forward  the role of the increasing returns inside the 
firms.  This development is consolidated by the assumption of the mobility of  workers.  The 
displacement of the workers  in favour  the area whose real wages are higher, generates a 
delocalization of the individual expenditure favorable to this area, and thus, increases the 
relative size of markets.  The incorporation of the costs of transport, pushes the firms with  
ascending returns  to be located on the broadest market in order to exploit these returns. Each 
area accomodating a more significant number of the firms is that whose local production in 
differentiated goods is varied.  Intented by the valorization of   products variety, there will be 
an attraction of new consumers, which will amplify the former effect of demand and 
constitutes an additional reason for the agglomeration of the firms. Several models of 
geographical economy suppose that diversity relates also to the intermediate goods in the 
production of consumption goods (Krugman and Venables 1995, Venables 1996).  According 
to Krugman and Venables (1995), beside  sectors opérating in  perfect competition   there are 
many industries connected by supply and demand’s relations.  These industries, form only one 
sector in imperfect competition, in which a variety of good produced by a firm can constitute 
an intermediate goods for all the other firms.  These last, when they are concerned to the 
valorization of the diversity of intermediate goods offered on the market, have a constant 
returns compared to work, and  growing returns with the number of different factors.  From 
these theoretical bases, it proves that the role of diversity to explain  the geographical 
agglomeration rests on the manner and the width with which the firms and the individuals 
develop the differentiated goods. Granstrand (1998) and Suzuki and Kodawa (2004) tried to 
solve this dilemma by showing that a certain threshold of specialization is required in order to 
reach a necessary expertise along the procedure of research and thus improving " state-of- 
heart " of complex technologies.  So firms can obtain a fertilization of various technologies 
which are connected  to its pricipal activities.  Then, they can carry out profits through 
technologies exploited elsewhere by the other firms and which are not connected.  The 
majority of the empirical analyses interested by the articulation between technological 
diversification and the innovation at the level of the firm, is based on the proxies of the   
product diversification (M.G.Vega 2004).  Such studies supported the existence of a 
correlation between   product diversification and various measurements of the innovation 
which they are based on the intensity of the R&D (Grabowski 1968 and Teece 1980), the 
number of the technical workers (Gort 1962), or numbers it patents (Scherer 1984).  More 
recently, Veuglers (1997) examined the impact of the strategies of external source on the 
domestic expenditure of R&D  by relying on  the products diversification   as an additional 
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explanatory variable.  On the other hand, the approximation of technological diversification 
by product diversification, remains relatively contestable, and many problems appear.  
Gamberdella and Torrisi (1998) support the idea according to which  technological 
diversification of a firm is extremely wider than its diversification of product.  Healey and 
Matusik (2004) have advanced that the technical  knowledge and that of the market of product 
are distinct concepts  because"they are at the origin of the stages different from the chain of 
value ", and can be conditioned by different reasons.  Whereas technological diversification 
can be mainly justified by the challenge that a firm judges essential for its survival, via the 
improvement of its products or the reduction of the costs in a given market, product 
diversification is dependent on a whole of other reasons.  According to N.Kim (2002), product 
diversification   is one of the most significant aspects of the behavior of  firms during time.  
This is why, many studies tried to locate the factors that likely condition  products 
diversification at a largely disaggregated level.   There are several potential reasons for 
products diversification.  Initially, Jovanovic (1993) relates this diversification to profit 
generated by a more important part of market: A firm which holds a capacity of market in two 
substitutable products can carry out a higher profits than those of two monopolies in a single 
product.  Then, among the crucial reasons for the diversification of product, which were 
frequently treated in the literature, is the risk associated with the volatility of profits.  N.Kim 
(2002) shows, that under constraint of liquidity, the investment of the small firms depends on 
their cash-flows.  In this type of case, firms diversify their products with an aim of smoothing 
their profits, and thus, standing up against  the volatility of profit schoks at any width.   In 
other words, the shocks of aggregate sectoral and idiosyncrasic profits can affect the level of  
product diversification  of the firm.  Moreover, when the firms diversify their products to 
smooth their profits, they will have a greater capacity of anticipation of the future shocks. 
Beside, product diversification of firms can emerge as a consequence of the persistence of the 
decreasing returns of scale of the production.  This situation creates incentives for firms to 
explore new productive opportunities and to support the expansion inside relatively 
differentiated and more attractive industries. Thus, firms characterized by decreasing returns 
of scale of their productive apparatuses are incited to diversify their productions.  However, 
this advantage can be neglected if the fixed costs of the entry are weak and the firms take 
advantage of synergies between the productive units that divide common assets.  Granstrand 
et al. (1997) stress that the powerful firms are those which hold a broader variety of 
technologies to compete  in a narrow row of products. The results of Gamberdella and Torrisi 
(1998) reinforces this idea, by suggesting that this type of  firms, although they are equipped 
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with a spectrum of technological capacities which enable them to create more sophisticated 
and more developed products, focuses their field of activity in specific productive domains.  
  
1-3 -Intra-industrial trade and product diversification : 
 
       Many famous  models developed at the end of the 70 and at the beginning of the 80 
insisted on the profits of trade, associated more specifically to  intra-industrial trade based on 
the imperfect competition and the consumer's choices (Krugman 1979, Lancaster 1980, 
Falvey 1981 and Falvey and Kierzkowski 1987).  This literature classified the international 
trade in two principal types according to their inter or intra-industrial qualified by  "one-way " 
and "two-way " trade.  Concerned by the first type of trade, the theory of Heckscher-Ohlin 
provides that countries specialized in the intensive abundant factors goods.  With the opening 
of trade, countries will export certain goods, and will import others pertaining to different 
sectors, according to their comparative advantages.  Intra-sectoral trade(7)    refuses this 
approach.  Several theories explain the reason according to which  international trade can 
generate sectoral flows of type " two-way ". An interesting part of these theories refers to the 
differentiation of product, the economies of scale and the imperfect competition (Kierzkowski 
1985 and Helpman 1985). " Two-way " Flows  connect trade partners who are specialized and 
competitor in the production and the export of  similar but differentiated goods (L Fontagné, 
Mr. Freudenberg and NR.Péridy 1998). Since three decades, several models of international 
trade have been elaborated, based on the basic concept related to the monopolistic 
competition.  At this level, the synthesis worked out by Helpman and Krugman (1985) 
emerged as an orthodoxe news.  This synthesis considers that the products which are 
horizontally differentiated are theorekly  valid to the consumers under forms of different 
varieties, and because of the opening to the international trade increases the size of the 
market, it will stimulate the appearance of new varieties of goods as well as the realization of  
economies of scale.  On the other hand, the concept of the comparative advantage remains 
valid to the outdistanced countries in their  facors endownments or technological know-how.  
The international trade in the horizontally differentiated goods, implies that the countries offer 
to the various consumers, goods according to their tastes and preferences.  At this level, 
                                                 
(7) M. Freudenberg and F. Lemoine (1999) identified the intra-industrial trade like the simultaneous exports and 





positioning on the market is probably more sensitive to competition by the prices, because 
consumers can direct their preferences with different producers when the price or other 
characteristics varies (Hotelling 1929).  On the other hand, the international trade in the 
vertically differentiated goods, implies that the trade partners are able to choose a different 
positionings of their goods in the spectrum of quality, and the offer to  consumers is 
conditioned by the presence of  different incomes and  diversified  preferences for quality.  
The concept of horizontal differentiation was introduced in the models of endogenous growth 
according to the principle of the preference for the variety.  Such a representation finds its 
origin in studies of Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982).  The standard 
model of this interpretation is that of Romer (1990) which advances that horizontal 
differentiation " is characterized by the  preference of  individuals to  a widening of the 
variety of the available goods ". Thus, products differentiation can take the vertical or 
horizontal form where each product can exist in the form of several alternatives of quality or 
in a number of alternatives having same quality.  According to Lancaster (1979), the products 
having the same whole of characteristics, form a sector.  If it has a different proportion of 
characteristics, and none of them is intensively marked by a given characteristic, they are 
horizontally differentiated or similar.  This last typology (horizontally differentiated goods), 
reflects the existence of  different varieties at a given level of quality and reveals the 
preference for diversity.  The understanding of the concept of  horizontal differentiation was 
often based on an argument oriented either to demand and offer corner. Aside of demand, 
tastes and  individual preferences expressed by the consumers for a given variety of product, 
implies that the aggregate demand for this variety must be the subject of a horizontal 
differentiation and the decision of purchase of a good must depend on the inclusion of a 
specific characteristics which are preferred by the consumers in spite of the prices (S. 
Chiarlone 2000(8) .Aside of  offer, specializations of  firms are due to the internal returns of 
scale in the production. In contrast, if a product is more  strongly (slightly) marked by each 
characteristic than other products, it is more qualitatively higher (inferior).  It is the case of  
vertical differentiation in which, the goods seem presented accentuated differences in their 
prices in contrast with  horizontally differentiated goods.  In such a situation, this type of 
differentiation results from a preference of the individuals to the qualitative improvement of  
                                                 
(8) S. Chiarlone (2000): « Importation demand with product differentiation disaggregated estimate of italian 





goods in a fixed range. Wondering about the determinants of  intra-industrial trade, S. 
Chiarlone (2000) shows that the persistence of this type of trade between the most developed 
countries reflects that the level of economic development as well as the size of a country play 
a paramount role in the determination of the nature of international trade.  At this level, the 
tendency which clearly marked the Union European countries towards the intra-industrial 
trade and more particularly in the vertically differentiated products is a phenomenon which 
can be largely explained by the completion of the single European market(9)     .In an analysis  
concerned by the transition economies of  eastern and central Europe, M. Funkle and R.  
Ruhdwel (2003) shows that the variety of products is particularly significant for the 
economies producing only one limited row of goods.  Since the end of the 80, the mode of the 
international trade of these countries was radically changed both qualitatively and 
quantitatively.  The tariffs were reduced, many quantitative restrictions (quotas) were 
dismantled and controls of the exchange were virtually eliminated.  Beyond, the trade was 
reorientated from the East to West.  These developments have offered opportunities 
particularly targeted to the small producers who move from restricted local markets to the 
wide foreign markets, and thus,  allowing a readjustment of their structures of production and 
a massive increase in their imports.  For the countries having a large size markets, they offer 
at once, a vaster variety of products (horizontal differentiation) and a more significant 
spectrum of quality (vertical differentiation). In fact, the size of market tends to reinforce the 
share of  intra-industrial trade in the total of the trade in contrast with interindustrial trade. 
Regarding to the effect of the returns of scale, the most developed countries are more efficient 
in the industries characterized by significant external economies of scale.  Moreover, 
differences in size between the trade partners will have to promote interindustrial 
specialization and thus, restrict the share of intra-industrial trade.  At the beginning of the 80, 
several models of  intra-industrial trade, based on a structure of market characterized by the 
monopolistic competition (Dixit and Norman 1980, Krugman 1980,1981 and Lancaster 1981) 
allotted a crucial role to the economies of scale for horizontal differentiation.  Whereas,  Dixit 
and Norman (1980) and Krugman (1980,1981) suppose the prevalence of " love of variety" 
approach, Lancaster (1980) followed by Helpman (1981) insist alternatively on the 
importance of the " ideal variety "approach.  More recently, J. Gullastrand (2001) resorted to 
these two approaches in order to model the demand for a given variety.  He  considers that 
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these two approaches lead, at once, to a horizontal differentiation of the products, if no 
classification of the various levels of quality is observed.  At the level of  production, each 
firm carry out internal economies of scale relatively weak, and maximizes its profits as long 
as it keeps constant its strategy of price and the choice of the variety of all  other firms.  For 
each industry, the liberty of entry permited by relatively weak economies of scale, allows the 
presence of a significant number of firms, and thus, a structure of market that is of  
monopolistic competition type.  Later, Eaton and Kierzkowski (1984), introduce horizontal 
differentiation into the context of oligopoly: If there are two identical economies and two 
groups of consumers having different preferences for varieties, international trade led to a 
situation in which, there exists in each products market only one for each variety, that in turn 
generates intra-industrial trade.  In other words, and compared to the traditional theory of 
trade which suppose that the structure of specialization between industries and  sectors is 
determined by the comparative advantages, in the recent  theory of trade, specialization inside 
industries  is principally supported by economies of scale  . The existence of the economies of 
scale, implies that each firm inside a given industry specializes in a variety which is not 
produced elsewhere as long as there exist some demand for this product in various countries.  
However, the number of the varieties which is exported by a country, depends on the structure 
of specialization at an aggregated level, which is determined by the comparative advantages.  
For this reason, it is possible to observe a more intensified degree of intra-industrial trade in 
the total trade when the relative endownments of factors between two trade partners become 
more similar.  Moreover, Bergstrand (1990) has recently developed a theoretical study, which 
explains the relationship between the share of intra-industrial trade in the total of international 
trade and the edownments of factors as well as the income. The basic determinants of this 
share that were stated by the analysis of Bregstrand (1990), are the differences in income 
(total and per capita), the average income and also the differences in the ratios of  
capital/travail endownments.  The determinants of intra-industrial trade specific to an industry 
are less explicit than those specific to the countries. However, the products are not only 
horizontally differentiated, but can be also qualitatively differentiated: It is the case of vertical 
differentiation (Falvey 1981). Such distinction, modifies theoretical developments (M. 
Freudenberg and F Lemoine 1999): Following the approach of " integrated balance ", 
economic distance between countries is not the only base for interindustrial specialization, but 
can also consolidate specialization along the rows of quality inside industries.  The model 
developed by Falvey (1981) and completed by Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) constitutes 
mainly the reference fondatrice of vertical differentiation. In the context of the theory of 
 13
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson, with the liberty of movement of  capital between  firms 
belonging to a given sector and either between the sectors, Falvey (1981) attaches  quality of  
products to the capital intensity in the production.  If ratio of capital / work differs inside the 
groups of products, the abundant countries in capital will produce and export capital intensive 
products, with high quality, whereas the abundant countries in factor work export work 
intensive products  with low quality.  As an attempt  to improve this reasoning, Falvey and 
Kierzkowski (1987) show that the consumers holding  highest incomes will receive a  set of 
varieties with highest quality and the share of  vertical intra-industrial trade in the bilateral 
trade is all the more raise if differences in the ratios capital / work and thereafter in the 
incomes per capita of the two countries, are more significant.  Vertical differentiation was 
beforehand built-in in the models of intra-industrial trade by Shaked and Sutton (1984), 
characterized by oligopolistique market structure.  They suppose that quality of  products 
depends on the expenditure of R&D encrusted in the fixed costs, and so it is often specific to 
the highly technological sectors.  By preserving the theoretical developments of Falvey (1981) 
and Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987), according to which consumers having more raised 
incomes will  require goods of higher quality, balance is realized by following a game with 
three stages.  With the opening to the international trade, and under the effect of the 
economies of scale, the average cost of  firms which maintain their competitiveness, decrease, 
and thus, enhance the profitability of R&D. Indeed, the commercial policy allows the 
transmission of the price’s signals from the world market to the national economy.  These 
signals imply the coherence and the allowance between the resources and the comparative 
advantages.  Moreover, the localizations of firms in the various markets are posed like a 
stimulant of the intra-industrial trade of vertical nature.  In this model, if the average costs 
increase in a moderate manner with the improvement of quality, the structure of market in 
question is that of natural oligopoly.  However, the interindustrial differences in the 
possibilities and the extent of the decreasing costs are not necessarily articulated in a 
foreseeable or coherent way with the implications as regards the intra-industrial exchanges.  
This is strongly dependent on the nature of the products, the size of the total market and the 
scale of production with minimal efficiency (Greenaway and Milner 1986 p.122).  In this last 
case, model of CHOS marks obviously that intra-industrial specialization is caused by the 
economies of scale, but the model postulates that the minimum scale of efficiency must be 
relatively weak to allow the existence of a high number of firms inside an industry. In 
contrast, a minimum scale of larger efficiency implies, for a given size of market a lower 
number of firms, and a more reduced share of intra-industrial trade in the total of the trade.  
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Ethier (1989 p.390), shows a similar conclusion specific to the trade in the intermediate 
goods: « In spite of the existence of internal economies of scale and differentiation of 
products, the degree of such phenomena is not equivalent to an essential determinant of the 
extent of the intra-industrial trade ". In a model with preference in Lancaster, Greenaway and 
Milner (1984 chapitre4 p.112) postulated that in case of multi-product(10)  firms, intra-
industrial trade is in general more justified by the effects of   economies of scale compared 
with the extend of decreasing costs,  in order to support the presence of a significant number 
of firms and/or products.  In fact, the presence of the significant fixed costs can not only 
create entry appropriatenesses of a new advantageous variety in the form of the entry of a new 
firms, but also encourage multi-product firms to distribute the standing fixed overheads 
between a higher number of varieties.  However, " if domestic capacity of market of the firms 
increases and the possibility as well as the incentive of the adoption of  entry dissuasive 
strategies(11)    are reinforced more and more, the effect on the foreign entry, and thus, on the 
extent of intra-industrial trade becomes less foreseeable"  (Ibidem p.112).  In other words, it 
is not possible to affirm the existence of a continuous and direct relation between the intra-
industrial trade and the extent of the economies of scale. Besides above mentioned 
determinants, S. Chiarlone (2000) shows that the costs of transport have negative effects on 
the two types of intra-industrial trade: The changes in the costs of transport and the costs of 
transaction in general, can affect the structure of intra-industrial trade.  This negative relation 
between the distance (cost of transport) and the share of intra-industrial trade in the total trade 
is revealed through the amplified differences between the geographically outdistanced 
countries, in measurement that when  products are substitutes (differentiated), demand is more 
sensitive to the differences of   prices.  







                                                 
(10) Firms producing a number of varieties of given goods.  
 




Section 2 : Opérational proxies of products variety : 
  
     Although theoretical studies support clearely the possibility of anecdotes results and their 
coherence with the stylized facts, no  formal test is completed for the ultimate confirmation in 
favour of a given measurement of products variety. This is probably due to the difficulty to  
provide a direct measurements of products variety on the one hand, and to ensure the 
international comparability on the  another hand.  This difficulty which was largely at the 
origin of the divergence between economic theory,  empirical and econometric results, is 
explained by the unavailability of the data relating to products variety(12)  during time and 
between  countries. For this reason, our primary stage consists in building a data base of 
products variety.  We try in what follows to answer the two following questions : 
 Which methodology we can o  adopt to estimate  products variety between countries?   
 Which are the data relating to the differentiated products, largely disaggregated and 
coherent with our analysis inter country?   
       
In what follows, we will adopt method previously elaborated by Feenstra (1994) and Feenstra 
and Markusen (1994).  These studies proceeded by relying on a function of production of the 
type CES in which the inputs are non symmetric, in order to obtain a direct  proxy of  
products variety. Therefore, we lay out on two units of observation related to two countries, 
noted S and T. We suppose that the output, y T  of the country T is given by the following 
function of production: 
 
                                         Yt = f (xt ; It) = [∑iЄIt aixitσ-1/σ] σ/σ-1 (1) 
 
Where σ > 1, is the elasticity of substitution, X it  quantity of input I in the country T, and I T, 
the whole of the inputs in the country T. If  inputs available in the country T are counted by 1 
to NR T,   we have: I T =  {1,..... NR T }.  The corresponding cost function is: 
 
                            C (pt, It) = [∑iЄIt bi pit(1-σ)] 1/1-σ                                                         (2) 
 
                                                 
(12) Even in the famous data bases. 
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Where p it  is the price of the input and  bi = aiσ.  Following Feenstra and al. (1992) and 
Feenstra (1994), we choose the common intermediate goods related to countries as follows:   
                                                                  I= Is ∩ It 
Thus,  corresponding products variety PV St  is formulated as follows(13) :    
 
                                  ∑iЄI. pitxit / ∑iЄI pitxit 
             ∆PVst=    [————]                        (3)      
                                  ∑iЄI. Pisxis / ∑iЄI pisxis
               
          
If this ratio exceeds the unit, this indicates a higher variety of products in  country T than that 
in  country S. In the particular case, where all  inputs enter symmetrically, the numerator of 
the equation (3) is simplified to Log (Nt /Ns). If this ratio is positive, it implies that country T 
disperses more slightly its outputs between the categories of products than the country S.  
However, the measurement of  products variety based on this methodology is not safe from 
certain failures.  Indeed, according to this approach, a very diversifying exporter, must be a 
very diversifying producer, and  reversed situation is not necessarily true.  Some intermediate 
goods produced inside the nation are not marketed at international level.  Nevertheless, such 
methodology has a great economic and social significance, particularly when the majority of  
goods is the object of international trade.  Later, M. Funkle and R. Ruhwedel (2003), adopted 
a measure of products  variety not less operational which was founded before by Romer 
(1994) by creating an interaction between intensive and extensive margin of importation(14).  
According to this methdology, as a country concentrates all its imports in a restricted number 
of products varieties, it will have a higher intensive margin of importation and a weaker 
extensive margin. In contrast, when a country distributes slightly its imports on several 
products varieties, it will carry out a weaker intensive margin of the imports and a higher 
extensive margin. The same branch of literature (Mr. Funke and R. Ruhwedel 2003), resorted 
to an additional measurement founded on data related to exports of a country compared to 
those of the United States.  In order to detect the differentiated importance of each modeling 
approach, these economists selected the variety of exports in the category of investment goods  
                                                 
(13) See supposition (1) in Feenstra (1994). 
 
(14) The intensive margin of the importation measures the share of the imports of a country in the total of the 
world imports for the varieties of products specific to this country.  The extensive margin measures the fraction 
of the world imports of the varieties of products specific to a country in the total of the world imports.  
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and consumption goods. However, the indicators of products variety which are focused only 
on the data of export are criticizable.  Indeed, although they are largely differentiated, inputs 
which are not produced inside a country, can be massively available elsewhere.  In other 
words, the products variety in a given country depends not only on exports but also and 
potentially on imports. Quality and products variety proxies are often retained from data 
related to the international trade.  However, the explicit sensitivity of proxies based on 
international trade to the degree of the commercial opening of a country, tariff and nontariff 
barriers and with the movements of  exchange rate is a major disadvantage. In the most case, 
theoretical method adopted in order to measure the intra-industrial trade is overlap method 
initiated by Grubel and Lloyd (1975) and having the following form:   
 
                                                                         
                                                                      Xk,p,t+ Mk,p,t - |  Xk,p,t – Mk,p,t | 
        Index of Grubel et Lloyd (GL) =      —————————————                         (4) 
                                                                                   Xk,p,t+ Mk,p,t  
 
 
K = Trade partner  
P = Product 
T = Time  
 
However, this method has been the object of various refinements along the empirical 
literature.  According to Fontagné and Freudenberg (1997), the method of Grubel and Lloyd 
prove nonrelevant in measurement that it implies that  majority of flows between  imports and  
exports, consist with a trade having at once intra and interindustrial narture, whereas the 
minority revêt the form of an intra-industrial trade type.  Moreover, a considerable share of  
intra-industrial trade can be due to an insufficient disintegration that it is geographical or 
sectoral. An ascending number of empirical studies distributes flows of intra-industrial trade 
to horizontal and vertical shares.  Abd-El-Rahman (1991) uses a technique which was since, 
very current, and aims to separate the two shares of intra-industrial trade by relying on the 
ratio of unit values / ton of exports and imports.  If the ratio is outside a row that is specified 
beforehand, the flow of trade is defined as qualitatively différentiated. The aggregation 
problem arises according to two dimensions, geographical and industrial. Geographical 
dimension deeply insists on the failure of the multilateral approach, in measurement that 
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according to this approach evaluation of intra-idustriel trade can be largely biaised : Exports 
of a homogeneous product towards a trade partner can be simultaneously imported of another 
trade partner.  In the case of the incorporation of the costs of transport, this structure of trade 
is compatible with the traditional models of trade (Bergtrand 1983). In order to minimize 
geographical aggregation biais, flows of bilateral trade are per assumption preferred to the 
flows of multilateral trade.  The industrial dimension of  aggregation problem insists on the 
need to apply the data related to the intra-industrial trade to a  rather weak aggregation level. 
Fingers (1975) shows that the statistical classification of  international trade data adapts with 
different intensities of factors for the various products. Therefore, intra-industrial trade is 
simply assimilated to a statistical phenomenon, caracterized by an inconvenient categorization  
of products. In contrast, orientation of  studies to weak aggregation level, reinforces the 
existence of  intra-industrial trade, which contradicts the statistical aspect of this type of trade.  
Beside, problem leaded by aggregation of final goods according to their intensities of factors, 
these  aggregation biais can be revealed through the fragmentation of  production  processes: 
On the basis of the idea according to which the activity of industries are targeted at once to 
final and intermediate goods,  intra-industrial trade led to a raised level of aggregation, which 
can take the form of an exchange between the two types of final and intermediate goods.  In 
other words, it is necessary to refer to a level of aggregation  relatively weak in order  to draw 
aside flows of trade explained by the comparative advantages.  This idea is supported by 
Vona (1990) which shows, that as level of aggregation weakens, variation in the contents of 
factors decreases.   
 
 In a macroeconomic scale, empirical studies has used several index to measure the 
differentiation of the international trade(15).    A significant number of this studies resorted to 
the methodology developed by Abd-El-Rahman (1986) and Freudenberg and Muller (1992).  
This methodology is based on the   " overlap " index and is formulated as follows:   
    
                                                      Min (Xk,p,t , Mk,p,t) 
            Index  of Overlp (IO) = ————————                                                  (5) 
                                                      Max (Xk,p,t Mk,p,t)    
                                                 
(15) Few attempts relating to the products diversification  were led at the microeconomic scale.  Among these 
analyses we can quote those of Gollop and Monhahan (1991), which show that until  1982,  firms are specialized 
inside the factories but are diversified between the factories.  More recently, NR Kim (2002) used the index of 




 The  overlap index can reconcile between the two incompatible paradigms related to the two 
types of international trade, based on the imperfect competition on one  side, and the perfect 
competition of another side.  This last indicator measures the extent of overlapping between 
imports (M) and exports (X) of a two countries in their structures of international trade.  If it 
is high, this is equivalent to a significant overlapping. In this last case, we consider   overlap 
as a structural  specificity of international trade and flow is assimilated to " two-way "trade.  
In the contrary case, overlap cannot be described as structural.  It is the case of  " one-way " 
trade. Thus the existence of " two-way "flow, is revealing of a product differentiation  
(horizontal and vertical). Consequently, it is possible to operate a rupture of bilateral trade 
between that in the homogeneous products and that in the differentiated products. Generally, 
if the index of overlap exceeds a certain arbitrarily fixed threshold, the total trade of this 
product is assimilated to a " two-way "flow. A change of this threshold, implies a 
modification of the extent of inter and intra-industrial specialization. A weaker threshold 
value reduce the importance of interindustrial specialization. At this stage, we follow 
Freudenberg et al. (1998) and we select a threshold of 10 % in order to distinguish between    
" one-way " and " two-way "flows.  If overlap is higher than 10 %, flows are characterized by 
a differentiated products, if not, they are homogeneous. With regard to typologies of 
differentiation and by reasoning at a sufficiently disaggregated sectoral level, the qualitatively 
differentiated goods will have to reveal increased differences in the prices, contrary to other 
goods.  Compared to our level of disaggregation, the indices of unit value represent a reliable 
" proxies " of the prices of goods, and thus, we  can resort to the index of quality to measure 
the differences in qualities between imported and domestic goods.  In other words, the 
distinction between the two types of differentiation, horizontal and vertical, refers to the 
criterion of similarity of  products, based in its turn on the ratio between the unit value of 
exports (UV(X)) and  imports (UV (M)). This criterion can analytically be formulated as 
follow:   
                                                                   
 
                                                                     UV(X)                                              
                                    Index of quality = ———                                                       (6) 
                                                                     UV(M)     
 
 If the index of quality is very high or very weak, the differences in prices indicate differences 
in quality between   imported and domestic goods.  If it is close to the unit, this is equivalent 
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to a qualitative similarity. To be done, we have followed the literature (Freudenberg and 
Lemoine1999) and we resorted to an exogenic interval of values] 1/1+α, 1+α [(16). If quality 
index   is external to this interval, the flows of trade refer to the qualitatively differentiated 
goods, if not,  it concern the horizontally differentiated goods.  With regard to the vertical 
differentiation, two types of case arise: It is considered  superior if  quality index is included  
in the interval ]  1+α, +∞ [,  and inferior if this index belongs to the interval  [ 0, 1/1+α ].  
S.Chiarlone (2000) attribute to country adopting the superior vertical differentiation the 
opportunity of an exporter of quality, and an importer of quality for that according  a strategy 
of inferior vertical differentiation.  The parameter α is a factor of dispersion arbitrarily fixed.  
In général, α is   fixed  to 0,15. This value, shows that in the case of intra-industrial trade, the 
costs of transport are improbably incorporated in the prices of products, in order to measure 
the difference between the unit values of exports and   imports with a variation limited to 
±15(17).  If the index of quality reveals that the quality of exports is higher than of  imports, 
this reflects a better positioning on the world’s market compared to the trade partners and 
national industries are protected by competition of the prices.  In the contrary case, a 
qualitatively underpriviledged positioning implies that national exports can be unfavourably 
affected by competition following the emergence of  producers adopting  a weak price and 
low quality.  The basic assumption of criterion previously mentioned is that   prices (unit 
values) are assimilated to a reliable indicators of qualities.  This positive relation between 
price and quality reflects that in the context of perfect information, a given variety of a good 
can be sold at a higher price if it has a higher quality.  In spite of criticisms addressed to the 
proxies based on the unit value (in the short term, the consumers can buy a more expensive 
product for reasons other than quality), this approach was usually used by an alluring line of 
empirical studies (J Gullstrand 2001).  This branch of literature, supposes that at least, at a 
sufficiently disaggregated level, the relative prices can reflect relative qualities. The 
application of the two above mentioned indices, overlap index and  quality index, allows the 
classification of each flow of trade, and thereafter, the degree and the nature of the product 
differentiation at a high level of disaggregation to avoid any biais of aggregation that it is 
geographical or industrial.   
                                                 
(16) This interval appears much more rigorous than that traditionally used in the economic literature of value 
] 1 α, 1+α [.  
 
(17) In several similar studies, the value of 0,15 was considered very weak. Difference between CIF (for the 




Section 3: Empirical results: Case of Tunisia  
 
 
     The procedure above, relative  to proxies of the products differentiation, is applied in the 
case of Tunisia by relying on the data based on international standard by industry 
classification (ISIC, revision 3).  In fact, this data base presents some limits: According to this 
methodology, a very diversified exporter must be necessarily a very diversified producer and 
the reversing case is not always true.  Nevertheless, since the countries of our sample pursued 
a policy of trade liberalization of great scale, such insufficiencies can be neglected. Moreover,  
such methodology can overtake the geographical or industrial aggregation problems. 
Therefore, we opted to direct our analysis towards the differentiation structure of  Tunisian 
products with the 13 OECD countries (see appendix A).  Beyond, in order to apprehend 
clearly the sectoral share of the differentiation structure  of Tunisian products, we targeted our 
analysis to the 8 following manufacturing sectors: Agriculture, hunting and forestry;  food, 
beverage and tobacco;  mining, quarrying and petroleum;  chemicals;  wood, paper and 
printing ;  textile, leathers and footwear;  basic metals and fabricated metal products;  
electrical machinery.   
 
Former empirical analyses classified the European Union Countries in two principal groups  
which correspond to the " cores " and " peripherals " countries.  Generally the first group is 
composed of  countries in which  intra-industrial trade represents a value superior to the half 
of total intra-European trade.  This structure of   trade is explained by fast convergence of the 
most developed European countries.  The second group corresponds to the countries whose 
levels of economic development are lower and they are characterised by an interindustrial 
specialization.  
 
  From table n°1, Tunisia adopts a considerable share of two-way trade.  The one-way trade in 
the similar products and based on the comparative advantages, is mainly directed towards 
countries other than  European Union  (except for Denmark and Sweden)  that is, Canada, 
United States and Japan with respective shares of  88.23%    45.76%   and 36%  of total trade 
flows.  This, reflects the importance of the role assigned by the geographical proximity to 
explain the structure of the international trade, and thus, the products differentiation. For the 
majority of Tunisian trade partners, the prevalence of two-way trade is exclusively due to the 
vertical products differentiation (less specialization between industries along the comparative 
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advantages and more intra-industrial trade in qualitatively differentiated goods).  In other 
words, trade in vertically differentiated products is much heavier than in horizontally 
differentiated products.  This indicates a specialization in the rows of the quality inside the 
sectors and which takes place on a largely disaggregated level. This structure of 
differentiation is related particularly to  United Kingdom, Italy and Greece.   
              
Table n°1 :   Structure of   products differentiation of  Tunisia (in % of   total trade flows):    




              
     two-way  Trade 
   






    12.41  3.44  84.15 
Belgium  
   0.000 23.000 77.000 
Canada  
    88.230 3.400   8.370 
Denmark  
    77.790 0.000   22.210 
Spain      2.830  2.720 94.450  
 United States  
    45.760 0.000   54.240 
France       0.000 51.400   48.600  
Greece  
     9.950 0.000    90.050  
Italy     2.000 0.000 98.000 
Japan     36.000 47.000 17.000 
 Netherlands  
    8.734 52.800   38.466 
 United Kingdom 
     1.140 0.000  98.860  
















                    Source : Our calculation and database of National intitut of statistics 
 
 The two-way trade in the horizontally differentiated products concerns particulierly 
Netherlands, France and Japan with  respective shares equivalent to  52.8% ;   51.4%   and 
47%  of total trade flows of Tunisia.   By referring to  overlap and quality’s indices, this type 
of differentiation is practically null with certain trade partners: Greece, Italy, Sweden, United 
Kingdom and United States. In other words, the overlap index shows that the similarity in 
trade specialization is only specific to some trade partners who are mainly the European 
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Union countries except for Denmark and Sweden.  For these trade partners of Tunisia, 
bilateral flows in the same industrial sector and the differentiation of products,  override 
specialization. By focusing oneself on the sectoral distribution of Tunisian products 
differentiation, we notes from table n°2 that the following sectors textile, leathers and 
footwear;  electrical machinery; mining, quarrying and peutroleum ; and chemicals occult  the 
first rank in the two-way international trade.  The share of each one of these sectors in the 
differentiated products trade represents roughly the total of trade flows in 2003.  
 
 
        Table n° 2: Evolution of  products differentiation of  Tunisia (in % of total  trade flows): 





       Source : Our calculation and database of National intitut of statistics 
 
 
The observation of the extent of the international trade in the differentiated products which 
separates period 2000-2003, marks the absence of an homogeneous evolution of the 
differentiation strategy of  Tunisia.  Indeed, except for textile, leather and footwear whose 
share of   two-way trade grows with a weak annual rate of 0.15% during the period 2000-2002 
and 0.20% between 2002 and 2003, we observes heterogeneous structure of the trade in the 
products differentiated for the other manufacturing sectors.   
 
       one-way trade        two-way trade  
          Sectors 2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Agriculture, hunting and 
forestry 
39.55 61,84 17.4 52 60.45 38.16 82.6 48 
food, beverages and tobacco 40.78 41,37 42.6 31 59.22 58.63 57.4 69 
              Chemicals 
 
5 7.20 14.6 2.1 95 92,8 85.4 97.9 
Textile, leathers and footwear 
 
0.60 0.45 0.3 0.1 99.4 99.55 99.7 99.9 
Wood, paper and printing 
 
23.13 36.80 48.9 19 76.87 63.20 51.1 81 
Mining, quarrying and 
petroleum 
11  0.1 52.9 0.02 89 99.9 47.1 99.98 
Basic metals and  fabricated 
metal products 
24.84 57.30 21 10.8 75.16 42.70 79 89.2 
 Electrical  machinery 
 
3.85 6.40 2.4 0.2 96.15 93.60 97.6 99.8 
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At the sectoral level, the stylized facts exposed in table n°3,  show the importance of the 
structure of vertical differentiation compared to  horizontal diffrentiation.   
 
     
Table n°3 :   Structure of  products differentiation of  Tunisia (in % of  total trade flows): 






















               Source : Our calculation and database of National intitut of statistics 
The index of quality reveals a relative weakening of horizontal differentiation between 2002 
and 2003 except for the two sectors : mining, quarrying and petroleum; wood, paper and 
printing. The prévalence of vertical flows compared to horizontal flows translates a fight 
position against  potential competing pressures launched elsewhere.  For agriculture, hunting     
and forestry; food, beverage and tobacco; and basic metals and fabricated metal products,  we 
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differentiated products.  In other words, Tunisia exports vertical and inferior differentiated   
goods  in exchange with  vertical and superior differentiated goods  in the above mentioned 
sectors. This structure of products differentiation  reflects an underpriviledged positioning of 
Tunisian industries include in such sectors and also translates  the intensity of the competition 
which they face.  Indeed, in these types of markets, Tunisian products can unfavourably be 
affected by the new competitors of the emerging countries, which are able to produce the 
same goods with weaker prices. The sectoral structure of vertical differentiation through the 
index of quality, shows that Tunisia specializes favorably in the spectrum of quality relative to 
mining, quarrying and petroleum with a massive share of 74.07% of the total trade flows in 
the differentiated products in 2003.  
 
However, as table n°4 indicates, vertical and superior differentiation in these sectors is related 
to trade flows with a specific trade partners: Japan for agriculture, hunting and forestry, 
France for textile, leathers and footwear and in a more geographically dispersed manner for     
mining, quarrying and petroleuml with Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom and 






















Table n°4:   Structure of   products differentiation of Tunisia (in 2003): 
Per country and sector 
 
 
Horizontal differentiation Vertical and inferior 
differentiation 
Vertical and superior 
differentiation 
Agriculture, hunting and 
forestry 
France, Germany, Greece, 
Netherland, United Kingdom 
and Belguim 
     Spain 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco 
              Japan France, Greece, Netherland, 
Canada and Belguim 
   Italy and United Kingdom 
         Chemical 
  France  and Belguim 
Germany, Greece, Spain, United 
Kingdom, Canada United States 
   Italy  and Netherland 
Wood, paper and 
printing 
Germany and spain France, Italy and Greece Japan and Belguim 
Textile, leathers and 
footwear 
Netherland, Canada and 
Japan 
Germany, Italy, Greece, Spain, 
United Kingdom, United states, 
Belguim 
      France 
Mining, quarrying and 
petroleum 
France and Germany Greece, Canada, United States, 
Japan and  Danemark 
Italy, Netherland, Spain, 
United Kingdom and 
Belguim 
Basic metal and 
fabricated metal 
products 
 France,  Germany, Greece, 
United Kingdom, Sweden, 
United States and Belguim 
Italy 
Electrical machinery France Germany, Sweden and Canada Italy, Netherland, Spain, 
United Kingdom, United 
States, Belguim and 
Danemark 
Source : Our calculation and database of National intitut of statistics 
 
 
Moreover, the dynamics of products diversification  revealed through the examination of the 
extent of horizontal differentiation is  practically absent for sectoes such as agriculture, 
hunting and forestry, and  basic metals and fabricated metal products. This is explained by the 
fact that Tunisia holds a comparative advantages in the agriculture, hunting   and forestry: The 
comparative advantage in this sector explains trade flows at a rate of 52% in  2003 (see table 
n°2).  In another side, Tunisia is mainly regarded as an importer of quality in the basic metals 
and fabricated metal products, in such a way that vertical and inferior differentiation   
dominates in this sector (this diffentiation represents 64.46 % of trade flows in 2003).   
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Conclusion:   
 
The analysis of  products differentiation drived at a sufficiently disaggregated level, and based 
on indicators related to the international trade, led us to emphasize the role of geographical 
proximity in order to explain   the structure of the international trade, and in tun, the extent of   
products differentiation. Indeed, the one-way trade  is mainly directed to countries other than 
those of the European Union and relatively outdistanced from Tunisia that is Canada,  the 
United States and Japan.  The recourse to the index of quality reveals that for the majority of 
the trade partners of Tunisia, the trade in the vertical differentiated products is much more 
significant than in the horizontal differentiated products during 2002-2003.  In other words, 
the two-way trade is particularly explained by the vertical differentiation of products.  The 
prévalence of vertical flows on horizontal flows reflects the intensity of international 
competition that Tunisia faces in the manufacturing sectors previously analyzed.  This 
position, is sometimes underpriviledged in particular in sectors such as agriculture, hunting  
and forestry;  food, beverage and tobacco;  and basic metals and fabricated metal products.  In 
these sectors the share of vertical  and inferior differentiation interests beyond half of trade 
flows.  In contrast, Tunisia is mainly an exporter of quality in mining, quarrying and 
petroleum  because of vertical and superior differentiation dominates in this sector. Finally, 
the sectoral distribution of differentiation structure shows that the strategy of products 
diversification  revealed through the analysis of the extend of  the horizontal differentiation of 
products is, practically absent in the sectors such as agriculture, hunting and forestry and basic 
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Appendix A : 
 
Choice of the sample:   
 
The countries which are the subject of our analysis are the principal trade partners of Tunisia.  
We limited ourselves to the 13 OECD countries that are: Germany  Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Spain, United States, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom 




























Appendix B : 
 
 






















Beluim 1.07 1.537 0.072 2.916 3.480 5.736             - 2.094 
Danemark    - -  -    - 0.387 0.072 - 0.953 
France 0.577 0.668 0.917 1.659 1.023 0.528 0.270 1.342 
Germany 1.355      -   - 1.740 0.627 0.984 0.420 0.809 
Greece 8.109 0.409 0.539 0.213   - 0.392 0.516   - 
Italy   - 2.058 7.521    - 0.766    - 0.873 5.883 
Netherland    - 0.982    -    - 0.583 0.519 0.891 4.135 
Spain 0.330    - 11.219    - 0.663 6.953    - 1.763 
Sweden     -        -     -    - 0.468 0.074 0.058 0.131 
United 
Kingdom 
   - - 0.354 2.093 0.887 0.585 - 1.323 
Canada    -     - 0.226     - 0.440 1.129 0.071     - 
Unired 
States 
0.423      - 0.897    - 0.586 0.243    -    - 
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